the rise of modernity and the problematizing of the authority of biblical law are deeply connected. This chapter examines Bentham's idea of biblical law and his reasons for rejecting its authority. These are worth exploring, for several reasons. First, they are the views of a leading legal positivist whose beliefs have shaped ideas of modern law. Not only that, but they have even affected our thinking about biblical law as well. Second, Bentham's views anticipate modern denials regarding the authority of biblical law. Third, despite its significance no-one, as far as I am aware, has analyzed this material.
II BENTHAM'S IDEA OF BIBLICAL LAW
Bentham's discussion of biblical law is set out in A Comment on the Commentaries, written in the 1770s but never completed. The incomplete status of some of Bentham's work is one of the challenges with which Benthamite scholarship must contend. At least the Comment saw the light of day; more than 180 years after Bentham's death, much of his work remains unpublished. 12 Yet the Comment was never abandoned. Dinwiddy tells us that Bentham, aged 80, added a further 300 sheets of manuscript to his original writings. 13 Clearly, the subject was an itch that never went away. Apostles.' 15 We notice at once that Bentham provides us with a secular exposition, from the outset. God is not identified as the original source and both bodies of law are said to be delivered by human beings (Moses, Jesus and the Apostles). We also notice that whereas
Moses delivers 'Law', Jesus delivers 'Law, as it is called' (emphasis added). Distinctions
within 'the Law of Revelation' are thus made on the basis of Bentham's own philosophy of its own claims to authority. However, this would take us too far afield of the present project; instead, I hope to address this separately in subsequent work. 12 In 2006, the general editor of The Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham estimated that at least another 40 volumes would be required to put previously unpublished material in the public domain. 13 John Dinwiddy, Bentham (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1989) 55. 14 Comment, 23. 15 Ibid. His lasting achievement is to identify what we today regard as the ideal characteristics of lawmaking. 22 His positivist ideal of law is implicit in the ideal of modern law which pervades our whole culture. It is rather like living in the shadow of a mountain so large no-one knows it is there. As a result, it is not surprising that Bentham's ideas have even permeated the discipline of biblical studies and are often projected by biblical scholars onto biblical law itself.
This means we are justified in taking Bentham's articulation of Torah as a philosophical starting point, even though scholars have been unaware of it for the best part of 200 years. As we rediscover Bentham's thinking on biblical law we find it is powerful and significant because it encapsulates a whole way of thinking about law and doing law-so much so that it even reflects modern scholarly assumptions about how we ought to read
Torah. There is a parallel here with HLA Hart's rediscovery of Bentham and legal rights; Hart explicitly used Bentham's work on legal rights because Bentham encapsulated a way of 22 It is worth noting here that for Bentham, especially, there is a distinction between definition of the phenomenon, in this case 'law' and its ideal form. His utilitarianism ('the science of legislation') certainly falls into the latter category.
thinking about rights that was deeply significant, even though it had lain dormant for a long time. 23 The problem is that, at point after point, Bentham's ideas do not fit the biblical texts.
Of course, there are commands, sanctions and subjects in biblical law. 24 But there is much more. For this reason, an adequate definition of biblical law must go beyond classical legal positivism (many would argue that an adequate account of modern law must go beyond this, too). I have argued elsewhere that torah (the Hebrew word often translated 'law' but which has the basic meaning of 'instruction' or 'teaching') is an accumulated phenomenon with multiple links to other expressions of normativity in the Bible, including narrative, prophecy and poetry. 25 For these and other reasons I define biblical law as 'an integration of different expressly repealed by Jesus, they are therefore still in force. To neglect them is impious. 33 Bentham does not tell us who these persons are. Possibly he refers to them because he wants to engage with the strongest (or most extreme) account of the authority of biblical law. Their views are, impliedly, unrepresentative of the wider Church because, he claims, even the most conventional and well-regarded Christians reject the authority of biblical law:
As to the notion of adopting the Law of Moses in its whole extent, even those articles of it that are of the nature of the political regulations, and in no wise concern the ceremonies of the Jewish religion this has been of late universally exploded by persons of all sects, in particular by writers of our own Church the most orthodox and the most distinguished for their attachment to religion. 34 Bentham does not cite any sources for this so, again, we do not know to whom he was 
B The New Testament is Inconsistent on the Subject
Bentham's next criticism follows from the preceding claim and states that the New Testament's view on the authority of biblical law is inconsistent:
That which the Will of Jesus, and of the Apostles, interpreters of his Will, is to be collected from, is the general aspect of their discourse towards the Law of Moses: now speaking in favour of it, and now in derogation. To speak now in favour, now in derogation of the same whole, would savour, it seems to have been supposed, of levity and inconsistency. It would seem not to be the discourse of a Legislator, much less of a divine one. This allows him to declare they are inconsistent and possess no authority as law.
In doing so, Bentham again fails to understand how biblical law makes claims upon the Christian (see section A above). Nor does Bentham allow for the fact that the meaning of the New Testament word for 'law' (nomos) is context-dependent. There are certainly times when the apostles-Paul, in particular -speak positively about 'the law' and times when they do not. But these variations arise because the different contexts concern right and wrong uses 47 with respect to such articles as are now useful, these it is now proper for us as Legislators to cause to be observed; as subjects, to observe… But under this explanation how can any human Law be contrary to this part of the Law of God, unless in as far as it is contrary to utility: that is, how can any man complain of such human law and argue for its being disobeyed on any other ground than that of his thinking it inexpedient?
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If even theologians use utility to identify which divine laws are valid, the authority of biblical law is ultimately grounded, not in its divinity but in its utility. 66 It is a kind of reverse alchemy; Bentham wants to take the gold of Torah and transmute it into the base metal of utilitarianism.
However, contrary to Bentham's assumptions, it remains the case that Christians can know the divine will independent of ideological claims to utility. First, as noted in section B, above, Christians have an alternative, consistent, basis for determining the continuing authority of biblical law. It is not dependent on utility. Second, Christians do not have to assume utility as the arbiter of biblical law because biblical law is not itself the product of autonomous reason. It is hard to imagine how either autonomous reason or the principle of utility could have given rise to the sort of radically egalitarian society we find described in biblical law (eg in regard to the distribution of land and political power). 73 All political revolutions benefit one social group or another and altruistic political revolutions are as unknown in the ancient world as they are in the modern. And since no single social group benefits from the political society found in biblical law there is no reason for it to have arisen. 69 The latter is a reference to circumcision as the sign of the covenant between God and claim that all attempts to apply biblical law in society are inherently damaging:
The people who composed the new colonies' (speaking of America) it has been observed by an historian of the first eminence 'imitated the Jewish polity in almost all respects; and adopted the books of Moses as the Law of the Land.' This the historian scruples not to speak of as being the effect of a 'contracted way of thinking and most violent enthusiasm.' 'The first laws which they made' (continues he) 'were grounded upon them' (upon the books of Moses) 'and were therefore very ill suited to the customs, genius or circumstances of that country, and of those times; for which reason they have since fallen into disuse. Neither reckoned with the endurance of the Bible. In fact, as modern historical accounts have shown, the influence of the Bible continued to be felt on the political development of the United States, and remains so to this day.
Second, Bentham endorses Burke's view that this apparent failure is due, ipso facto, to their being 'grounded… upon the books of Moses.' 87 But although this is presented as an empirical argument, the presence of the word 'therefore' reveals it is, in fact, an ideological claim since neither Bentham nor Burke will admit to the possibility that these laws could be 83 Burke's account was in its fifth edition at the time of Bentham's writing. Burns and Hart note that although the book is attribute to Edmund Burke, who revised it, the book was largely the work of his cousin, William, 25, n 2. 84 Bentham, Comment, 25-26 (emphasis in original). 85 Ibid, 200. 86 Ibid. 87 Ibid, 26.
successfully transplanted. It is not, then, the pragmatic argument it appears to be but an ideological claim. Bentham fails to allow for the possibility of virtue.
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We do find, elsewhere, that Bentham applauds the effective promulgation of biblical law and its commitment to transparent justice at the city gates. 89 This is not a contradiction for
Bentham because he finds these texts to be consistent with the principle of utility (see Part III section E). Yet, even here, Bentham's appreciation of biblical law is thin. He ignores additional ways his ideas could derive some support from biblical law. They include: the commitment in biblical law to disseminating knowledge of the law to all levels of society; the ideal of domestic justice; the avoidance of third party adjudication; due publicity; imaginative forms of punishment; the wise use of words and the use of motivation clauses. 90 Bentham ignores the positive intellectual and political legacy of biblical law, even when it would advance his principle of utility.
To conclude, just as Bentham constructs a definition of biblical law that does not do justice to the biblical texts so he also constructs arguments regarding the authority of biblical law that do not actually engage with the Bible's own conception of its authority. Space forbids even an outline treatment of how the Bible understands its own authority. But, at the very least, one would have to say that it goes well beyond a Benthamite notion of sovereign exercise of power to include the idea of authority as a legitimating permission that constitutes sufficient and meaningful grounds for action because it is grounded in a dimension of reality. elsewhere. This is relevant because there is considerable scholarly debate concerning the extent to which Bentham's 'religious radicalism' relates to his 'political radicalism.'
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Moreover, if it is the case that Bentham lost interest in developing the Comment further, we need to know whether Bentham's opposition to the authority of biblical law in that text is consistent with his, perhaps more developed, thought elsewhere. We can identify several main ways in which it is so.
A The Neophiliac Challenge
First, Bentham's opposition to biblical law is consistent with his opposition to anything that requires contemporary persons to surrender their own sense of judgment. Nothing that has either happened or was decided in the past can ground authority in the present:
Instead of being guided by their own judgement, the men of the nineteenth century shut their own eyes, and give themselves up to be led blindfold by the men of the eighteenth century… Men who have a century more of experience to ground their judgments on, surrender their intellect to men who had a century less experience, and who, unless that deficiency constitutes a claim, have no claim to preference. In knowledge in general, and in knowledge belonging to the physical department in particular, will the vast mass of mischief, of which perverted religion is the source, find its preventive remedy. 95 Bentham's opposition to biblical law is partly grounded in the fact it is a source of irrevocable law located in antiquity. 96 If it is bad enough to be led by laws that are a century out of date, how much worse it is to submit to those that are several thousand years old.
Here, too, Bentham's view is recognizably modern, anticipating what we could call the neophiliac challenge to biblical law. We belittle it simply because it is old. 97 However, we may question the strength of this position. It may be easy to assume that subjects such as medicine and the natural sciences are far more sophisticated than they were three or four thousand years ago; however, the same reasoning does not apply when carried over to other fields of human endeavour, such as law. We cannot assume, per Bentham, that 'new law' is always 'best'; that antiquity is a disqualification when it comes to legal reasoning and that the past has nothing to do with today. The reverse, in fact, is as likely to be true. For example, the political philosophy of Deuteronomy was so far ahead of its time that we do not find anything approaching the sort of programme it prescribes until the American founding fathers. 98 Nor should we underestimate the intellectual or the literary powers of people in biblical society. 99 Scholars have indeed found in the biblical laws and judgments a level of insight that has rarely, if ever, been surpassed. 100 As we have seen, Bentham himself admires the effective promulgation of biblical law and its commitment to transparent justice at the city gates. Bentham's position suits all sides very well: it lets the church off the hook from having to engage or confront the wider culture and leaves political leaders free to do whatever they like without appeal to higher authority.
There may be several additional reasons why Bentham's philosophy has shaped our understanding both of biblical law and its place in modern society. One reason, I suggest, is that we actively want a secular understanding of biblical law. We want to demystify divine law so that we can make it into what we want it to be. 112 Bentham, par excellence, provides us with the tools for a secularized reading of biblical law. This is reflected in his secular definition of biblical law and his secular exposition of its (lack of) authority. Another reason is that, throughout, Bentham's motivation is to present law in such a way as to enable external critique. His definition allows us to distance ourselves from law, the better so we can stand in judgement on it. This is part of the positivist mindset, and understandably so. It is because law is heteronomous and imposes major constraints and obligations upon us that it must always be subject to external critique. Again, it is plausible to suggest that a further reason why a Benthamite understanding of law is the default in biblical scholarship is because we want to keep biblical law 'at a distance', the better to pass judgment upon it. In this respect, critical biblical scholars may be said to work with an implicit positivist stance. This too is part of Bentham's opposition to the authority of biblical law is consistent with his prior ideological commitment to the principle of utility. Indeed, the following declaration is made precisely in the context of discussing biblical law:
The principle of utility once adopted as the governing principle, admits of no rival, admits not even of an associate. 113 The idea that the Bible constitutes a rival worldview may explain an unusual feature of You shall teach them diligently to your children, and shall talk of them when you sit in your house, and when you walk by the way, and when you lie down, and when you rise. You shall bind them as a sign on your hand…. (Deuteronomy 6:7-8).
In context, the importance of this verse lies in the fact that the covenant is consecrated with each member of Israel, which means that every single person is responsible for its faithful implementation. 116 Private and public morality-in Bentham's terms-are indeed linked. This could, of course, be coincidental; the Bible does not have a monopoly on the merits of parental instruction. However, we have already noted that Bentham commends biblical law in part because of its effective promulgation; since this is a key aspect of its dissemination, Bentham can hardly have been unaware of it.
Bentham also thinks that 'under any one Government should any such rationalized body of law, to any considerable extent be established, it will form an era in the history of
Bentham's 'scientific' project is birthed in such a religious context. The same dream-notes describe how, as Bentham was musing one night, an angel flew in through his window and put into my hands a book which he said he had just been writing… it was lettered on the back Principles of Legislation… all I had to do was to cram it as well as I could down the throats of other people: (they would it had the true flavour of the fruit of the tree of knowledge of good and evil). according to which a person may trace the whole of its horizon and though no one now living may be permitted to enter this land of promise, yet he who shall contemplate it in its vastness and its beauty may rejoice, as did Moses, when, on the verge of the desert, from the mountain top, he saw the length and breadth of the good land into which he was not permitted to enter and take possession.
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Whatever significance we attach to his words, it seems that even as Bentham seeks to undermine the authority of biblical law, he cannot help but ape its language and aspirations. about Torah is that he saw in it so much of what he wanted to achieve himself. At root, his rejection of biblical law is because he wanted Bentham, not God, to be god. 128 Ibid. 129 Ibid. 130 Bentham, Works, vol 1, 194.
VI CONCLUSION
Bentham's treatment of biblical law is flawed throughout. First, he forces biblical law onto the Procrustean bed of his legal philosophy. Second, he consistently misreads and misrepresents the biblical texts, both on their own terms and in regard to innate modes of Jewish and Christian reception and appropriation. Finally, he rejects the authority of biblical law because it rivals his ideals of modernity, secularity and utility. Yet despite their pervasive influence, Bentham's ideas concerning biblical law are well past their sell-by date. It is time to challenge his prejudices and recognize the paucity of his arguments. We need to jolt ourselves out of familiar, but misleading, assumptions about biblical law. Instead, we must pursue a revitalized understanding that is shaped, at point after point, by the covenant narrative of Israel and an essentially Jewish perception of reality-which in turn requires us to re-evaluate the place of biblical law in the modern public square.
